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JUST DESERTS FOR JUVENILES: PUNISHMENT VS. TREATMENT AND
THE DIFFERENCE IT MAKES
Barry Feld*
Introduction
The decision in 1967 of the Supreme Court of
the United States of America in the matter of
Gauit 1/ transformed the juvenile court into a very
different institution from that which had been
envisioned by its progressive creators. 2/ Judi-
cial and legislative efforts to harmonize the
juvenile court with Gault's constitutional mandate
have modified the purposes, processes and opera-
tions of the contemporary juvenile justice system.
The progressives envisioned a procedurally informal
court with individualized, offender-oriented dis-
positional practices. The Supreme Court's due
process decisions engrafted procedural formality
at adjudication onto the juvenile court's tradi-
tional, individualized-treatment sentencing schema.
As the juvenile court departs from its original
rehabilitative model, it now procedurally and sub-
stantively resembles adult criminal courts. 3/
This article analyses recent changes in the
sentencing practices and policies of juvenile
courts. Increasingly, the Principle of Offence
rather than an individualized determination of a
youth's best interests dominates the sentencing
decisions of juvenile courts. Changes in the
courts' purpose clauses to emphasize characteris-
tics of the offence rather than of the offender
reflect the ascendancy of the Principle of Offence.
So, too, does the implementation of a justice model
in sentencing, in which just deserts rather than
real needs prescribe the appropriate disposition.
Recent legislative changes in juvenile sentencing
statutes and correctional administrative guidelines
emphasize proportional and determinate sentences
based on the present offence and prior record and
dictate the length, location and intensity of
intervention. As a whole, these changes are both
an indicator of and a contributor to the substan-
tive as well as the procedural criminalizing of
juvenile justice in the United States.
However, the elevation of punishment raises
fundamental questions about the adequacy of
procedural justice in juvenile courts.
*University of
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Procedural informality and individualized.
offender-oriented dispositions in the
juvenile court
The juvenile court was one of several criminal
justice reforms introduced by progressives early
in the twentieth century. These reforms reflected
changes in ideological assumptions about the
sources of crime and deviance: the philosophy of
positivism led to efforts to identify the antece-
dent variables that cause crime and deviance and
thereby challenged the classic formulations of
crime as the product of free-will choices. 4/
Attributing criminal behaviour to external forces
rather than to deliberately chosen misconduct
focused efforts on reforming the offender rather
than punishing for the offence. The conjunction
of positivistic criminology, medical analogies in
the treatment of criminals and the growth of the
social science professions gave rise to the
so-called "rehabilitative ideal". 5/ Juvenile
courts used open-ended, informal and flexible pro-
cedures to rehabilitate deviants, since diagnosing
the causes of and prescribing cures for delinquency
required an individualized approach that precluded
uniform treatment or standardized criteria.
Juvenile court professionals hoped to substi-
tute a scientific and preventative approach for
the traditional punitive approach of the criminal
law. 6/ In separating child offenders from adult
offenders, the juvenile court rejected the juris-
prudence and procedures of the adult criminal law.
The important issues were the child's background
and welfare rather than the details surrounding the
crime. Juvenile court personnel enjoyed enormous
discretion to make dispositions in the best inter-
ests of the child and based their assessment on the
child's character and life-style. The specific
offence that a child had committed was accorded
only minor significance in the overall inquiry,
since it indicated little about a child's real
needs. To facilitate diagnosis and treatment,
dispositions were indeterminate and non-
proportional, and they continued for the duration
of minority.
Minnesota, Minneapolis,
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The constitutional domestication of the juvenile
court: procedural formality and individualized,
offender-oriented dispositions
When the decision of the Supreme Court in the
matter of Gault mandated procedural safeguards in
the adjudication of delinquency, judicial attention
focused initially on determining whether the child
had committed an offence, as a prerequisite to
sentencing. Gault's shift in focus from real needs
to legal guilt fundamentally altered the operation
of the juvenile court. Although the Supreme Court
hoped to retain the potential benefits of the
juvenile process, it insisted that the claims of
"the juvenile court process should be candidly
appraised. Neither sentiment nor folklore should
cause us to shut our eyes" to persisting recidi-
vism, the realities of juvenile confinement, the
stigma of a "delinquency" label or the arbitrari-
ness of the process. 7/ In subsequent juvenile
court decisions, the Supreme Court further elabo-
rated upon the procedural and functional equiva-
lence between criminal and delinquency pro-
ceedings. 0/
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 9/ however, the
Supreme Court denied juveniles the constitutional
right to jury trials in state delinquency pro-
ceedings and halted the extension of full proce-
dural parity with adult criminal prosecutions. The
McKeiver Court feared the adverse impact that jury
trials would have on the traditional informality,
flexibility and confidentiality of juvenile court
proceedings. It realized that jury trials would
make juvenile courts procedurally indistinguishable
from criminal courts and would raise more basic
questions about the need for a separate juvenile
court. 10/
The McKeiver Court justified the differences
in procedural safeguards between juvenile and
criminal courts on the treatment rationale of the
former and punitive purposes of the latter. How-
ever, the Court did not analyse the differences
between juvenile treatment and adult punishment,
simply noting that the ideal juvenile court system
is "an ultimate, informal protective proceeding",
even while acknowledging that the ideal is seldom,
if ever, realized. 11/
Despite the McKeiver Court's retrenchment, its
earlier decisions altered the form and function of
juvenile justice by shifting attention from the
"real needs" of a child to proof of crimes. 12/
Increasingly, the purposes and sentencing frame-
work of juvenile courts reflect the substantive
goals of the criminal law as well.
Just deserts in juvenile court
sentencing practices
While the criminal law punishes morally res-
ponsible actors for making blameworthy choices, the
juvenile justice system regards juveniles as less
culpable or responsible for their criminal mis-
deeds. Punishment involves the imposition by the
State, for purposes of retribution or deterrence,
of burdens on an individual who has violated legal
prohibitions. 13/ Treatment, by contrast, focuses
on the mental health, status and future welfare of
the individual rather than on the commission of a
prohibited act. 14/ Punishment and treatment make
markedly different assumptions about the sources
of criminal or delinquent behaviour. Punishment
assumes that responsible, free-will moral actors
make blameworthy choices and deserve to suffer the
prescribed consequences for their acts. 5/ Most
forms of rehabilitative treatment, by contrast,
assume some degree of determinism. Whether
grounded in psychological or sociological proces-
ses, treatment relies upon the existence of exter-
nal, antecedent causal forces as the source of the
individual's conduct and on the availability of
appropriate forms of intervention to modify or
eliminate the effects of those forces. 16/
Conceptually, punishment and treatment are
mutually exclusive penal goals. 17/ Punishment
imposes unpleasant consequences because of an
offender's past offences, while treatment seeks to
alleviate undesirable conditions in order to
improve the offender's future welfare. Treatment
assumes that certain antecedent factors cause the
individual's undesirable condition or behaviour,
and that steps can be taken to alter that con-
dition. Indeed, a degree of determinism is one of
the central tenets of the positivistic criminology
underlying the rehabilitative ideal of the juve-
nile court.
In analysing juvenile court sentencing prac-
tices, it is useful to examine whether the sen-
tencing decision is based on considerations of the
past offence or the future welfare of the offender.
When a sentence is based on an assessment of past
conduct - the present offence and prior criminal
record - it is typically determinate and propor-
tional and aims at retribution or deterrence. When
a sentence is based on the characteristics of the
offender, however, it is typically open-ended,
non-proportional and indeterminate and aims at
rehabilitation or incapacitation. 18/ The decision
is based on a diagnosis or prediction about the
effects of intervention on an offender's future
course. The non-proportional and indeterminate
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length of juvenile dispositions and the rejection
of punishment for blameworthy choices are the
principal points wherein juvenile courts differ
from criminal courts.
In the adult dispositional context, determi-
nate sentences based on the offence increasingly
supersede indeterminate sentences as just deserts
displace rehabilitation as the underlying sen-
tencing rationale. 19/ The optimistic assumptions
of progressives about human malleability are chal-
lenged daily by the observation that rehabilitation
programmes do not consistently rehabilitate and by
the volumes of empirical evaluations that question
both the effectiveness of treatment programmes and
the scientific underpinnings of those who admin-
ister the enterprise. 20/
Proponents of just deserts reject rehabilita-
tion as a justification for intervention for three
reasons: (a) the fact that an indeterminate sen-
tencing scheme gives discretionary power to pre-
sumed experts, (b) the inability of such clinical
experts to justify their differential treatment of
similarly situated offenders on the basis of vali-
dated classification schemata with objective indi-
cators, and (c) the inequalities, disparities and
injustices that result from therapeutically indi-
vidualized sentences. 21/ Just deserts sentencing,
with its strong retributive foundation, punishes
offenders according to their past behaviour rather
than according to who they are or may become.
Similarly situated offenders are defined and sanc-
tioned equally on the basis of relatively objective
and legally relevant factors such as seriousness
of offence, culpability or criminal history.
The same changes in sentencing philosophy are
now appearing in the juvenile justice process.
However, just deserts sentences for juveniles have
important implications for McKeiver's therapeutic
rationale and its procedural correlates. The
inability of proponents of juvenile rehabilitation
to demonstrate the effectiveness of therapeutic
intervention has led an increasing number of states
to incorporate just deserts sentencing principles
into their juvenile justice systems. The premises
of just deserts are that a juvenile's personal
characteristics or social circumstances do not
provide a principled basis for determining the
length or intensity of coercive intervention and
that "only a principle of proportionality (or
'deserts') provides a logical, fair and humane
hinge between conduct and an official, coercive
response". 22/
In the United States, juvenile justice admin-
istration is almost exclusively within the purview
of the states, subject only to the minimum federal
constitutional standards announced in Gault and
McKeiver. States' legislative statements of pur-
pose in juvenile codes and juvenile court senten-
cing statutes provide indicators of whether a
juvenile's disposition is punishment for her or
his past offence or treatment based on her or his
personal characteristics. 23/ Despite persisting
rhetoric from proponents of rehabilitative methods,
the dispositional practices of the contemporary
juvenile court increasingly are based on the Prin-
ciple of Offence and reflect the punitive character
of the criminal law.
The purpose of the juvenile court:
distinguishing punishment from treatment
The juvenile codes of most states contain a
purpose clause or preamble that sets forth the
rationale for the legislation; such a purpose
clause is intended to help courts interpret the
legislation. Since the first juvenile court was
created in Cook County, Illinois, in 1899, the
purpose of juvenile court law has been as follows:
to secure for each minor subject
hereto such care and guidance, preferably in
his own home, as will serve the moral, emo-
tional, mental, and physical welfare of the
minor and the best interests of the community;
to preserve and strengthen the minor's family
ties whenever possible, removing him from the
custody of his parents only when his welfare
or safety or the protection of the public
cannot be adequately safeguarded without
removal; and, when the minor is removed from
his own family, to secure for him custody,
care, and discipline as nearly as possible
equivalent to that which should be given by
his parents ..." 24/
Many states include this original statement of
purpose in their juvenile court preambles. 25/
They often include the additional purpose of
"remov(ing) from a minor committing a delinquency
offence the taint of criminality and the penal
consequences of criminal behaviour, by substituting
therefor an individual programme of counselling,
supervision, treatment, and rehabilitation". 2/
Although the juvenile codes of 42 states con-
tain a statement of legislative purpose or pre-
amble, 27/ within the past decade, 10 state
legislatures have redefined the purposes of their
juvenile courts. 2&/ These recent amendments
de-emphasize the exclusive role of rehabilitation
in the child's best interest and acknowledge the
importance of public safety, punishment and indi-
vidual and juvenile justice system accountability.
One of the distinguishing characteristics of this
new juvenile law is that "in many jurisdictions
accountability and punishment have emerged among
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the express purposes of juvenile justice
statutes". 29/
The State of Washington restructured its
entire juvenile code along the lines of the justice
model to emphasize retributive punishment and just
deserts rather than individualized treatment. 30/
The purpose clause of the statute reflects these
new goals, 31/ although the law still denies jury
trials in juvenile proceedings. 32/ Minnesota
redefined the purpose of its juvenile courts "to
promote public safety and reduce juvenile delin-
quency by maintaining the integrity of the sub-
stantive law prohibiting certain behaviour and by
developing individual responsibility for lawful
behaviour". 33/ However, while that new punitive
purpose marks a departure from the previous
rehabilitative purpose, the state's legislation
fails to provide for jury trials. 34/
Like the legislative changes in Washington and
Minnesota, the purposes of juvenile courts in other
states have become increasingly punitive, as shown
by the following examples: "correct juveniles for
their acts of delinquency"; 35/ "provide for the
protection and safety of the public"; 36/ "protect
society ... (while) recognizing that the applica-
tion of sanctions which are consistent with the
seriousness of the offence is appropriate in all
cases"; 31/ "render appropriate punishment to
offenders"; 38/ "protect the public by enforcing
the legal obligations children have to society";
39/ "protect the welfare of the community and ...
control the commission of unlawful acts by chil-
dren"; 40/ "protect the community against those
acts of its citizens which are harmful to others
and ... reduce the incidence of delinquent behav-
iour"; 41/ and "reduce the rate of juvenile delin-
quency and provide a system for the rehabilitation
or detention of juvenile delinquents and protect
the welfare of the general public". 42/
Some courts have recognized that these amended
purpose clauses signal basic changes in philosoph-
ical direction, "a recognition that child welfare
cannot be completely 'child centered'"- 43/ Courts
as well as legislatures increasingly acknowledge
that punishment is an acceptable juvenile court
disposition. In State v. Lawley, 44/ for example,
the Supreme Court of the State of Washington
reasoned that "sometimes punishment is treatment"
and upheld the legislature's conclusion that
"accountability for criminal behaviour, the prior
criminal activity and punishment commensurate with
age, crime and criminal history does as much to
rehabilitate, correct and direct an errant youth
as does the prior philosophy of focusing upon the
particular characteristics of the individual juve-
nile". 45/ Similarly, in In re Seven Minors, 46/
the Supreme Court of Nevada endorsed punishment as
a legitimate purpose of its juvenile courts: "By
formally recognizing the legitimacy of punitive and
deterrent sanctions for criminal offences, juvenile
courts will be properly and somewhat belatedly
expressing society's firm disapproval of juvenile
crime and will be clearly issuing a threat of
punishment for criminal acts to the juvenile popu-
lation." 47/
However, many of these legislatures and courts
failed to consider adequately whether a juvenile
justice system can punish explicitly without also
providing criminal procedural safeguards such as a
jury trial. Although a legislature certainly may
conclude that punishment is an appropriate strategy
for controlling young offenders, it should, when
it chooses to shape behaviour by punishment, pro-
vide the procedural safeguards of the criminal law.
Any ancillary social benefit or individual refor-
mation resulting from punishment is irrelevant to
the need for procedural protections.
Just deserts dispositions: legislative/
administrative changes in the sentencing
framework of juvenile courts
For most of the twentieth century, sentencing
practices were dominated by the philosophy of
positivism and by utilitarian, preventive or
rehabilitative penal policies. 48/ As long as the
views prevailed that offenders should be treated,
not punished; that the duration of confinement
should relate to rehabilitative needs; and that
penal therapists possessed the scientific expertise
to determine an offender's progress towards reform,
indeterminacy reigned unchallenged. The precipi-
tous decline of support for the rehabilitative
ideal in the 1970s reawakened the quest for penal
justice by sentencing similarly situated offenders
similarly, on the basis of relatively objective
factors, such as their offences. In a justice
process in which the systematic reform of indivi-
dual offenders remains an elusive goal, the quest
for equality, uniformity and consistency in
sentences acquires greater salience.
Analysing the sentencing statutes of juvenile
courts provides another indicator of whether a
disposition is for punishment or treatment. When
the sentence is based on the characteristics of the
offence, the sentence is usually determinate and
proportional, with a goal of retribution or deter-
rence. When the sentence is based on the charac-
teristics of the offender, however, it is typically
indeterminate, with a goal of rehabilitation or
incapacitation. 49/ Thus, it is useful to contrast
offender-oriented dispositions, which are indeter-
minate and non-proportional, with offence-based
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dispositions, which are determinate, proportional
and related directly to characteristics of the past
offence.
Historically, juvenile court sentences were
indeterminate and non-proportional and were aimed
at securing the best interests of the offender for
the future. Rather than punishing a youth's past
offences, the system tried to develop a programme
to alleviate the conditions that caused the delin-
quency. Like other clinical endeavours, a delin-
quency disposition entails diagnosis, classifica-
tion, prescription and prognosis: the sources of
the delinquency; its likely course if left
untreated; the appropriate forms of intervention
to alter those conditions; and the ultimate pros-
pects of success.
The contemporary juvenile sentencing provi-
sions of a substantial majority of states mirror
their progressive origins. Following an adjudica-
tion of delinquency, such statutes typically
describe a range of sentencing alternatives - dis-
missal, probation, out-of-home placement or insti-
tutional confinement - and give the juvenile court
judge broad discretion to impose an appropriate
disposition. 50/ In choosing among dispositional
options, some legislatures instruct the court to
consider the "least restrictive alternative". 51/
Typically, juvenile dispositions are indeterminate;
confinement may be for only one day, it may last
until the offender has reached the age of majority
or it may have some other statutory termina-
tion. 52/ Within this substantial range, the
judge's authority is formally unrestricted.
Even states that use indeterminate sentences
recognize the significance of the Principle of
Offence as a dispositional constraint. For
example, North Carolina law states that within the
range of alternative sentences, "the judge shall
select the least restrictive disposition ... that
is appropriate to the seriousness of the offence,
the degree of culpability indicated by the circum-
stances of the particular case and the age and
prior record of the juvenile". 53/ Similarly,
Iowa legislation instructs the sentencing judge to
consider "the seriousness of the delinquent act,
the child's culpability as indicated by the cir-
cumstances of the particular case, the age of the
child and the child's prior record". 54/
Determinate sentences in juvenile court
About one-third of the states now use either
legislative or administrative offence-based
criteria - determinate or mandatory minimum sen-
tencing statutes, or administrative sentencing
guidelines - to regulate some or all of the juve-
nile institutional commitment and release deci-
sions. These determinate or mandatory minimum
sentencing provisions attend to the seriousness of
the present offence, the nature of the prior
record, or both.
The most dramatic departure from traditional
juvenile justice occurred in 1977, when the State
of Washington enacted just deserts sentencing
legislation. 55/ That legislation sought indi-
vidual and system accountability through presump-
tive sentencing guidelines. 56/ The legislative
guidelines emphasize uniformity, consistency,
equality, proportionality, fairness and accountab-
ility rather than the traditional goal of rehabil-
itation. Under the statute and administrative
sentencing guidelines, presumptive sentences for
juveniles are determinate and proportional, based
on age, the seriousness of the present offence and
the prior record. 57/
Recent New Jersey legislation instructs juve-
nile court judges to consider the offence and the
criminal history when sentencing juveniles, and it
provides enhanced sentences for certain serious or
repeat offenders. 58/ The code revision of New
Jersey reflects a desire "to promote where
possible uniformity of sentencing term and ration-
ale for similar delinquent acts throughout the
State". 59/ Although the juvenile court judge
retains the discretion whether or not to incarcer-
ate a youth, the legislation provides "aggravating
and mitigating" offence criteria to guide that
decision. 60/ The New Jersey legislation creates
a "presumption of non-incarceration" for minor
offences by juveniles who do not have prior
adjudications but prescribes harsher penalties for
serious offenders. 61/
In 1987, Texas adopted determinate sentencing
legislation for some juvenile offenders. 62/ A
prosecutor may submit very serious offences to a
grand jury and, if the petition is approved and the
youth is convicted, "the court or jury may sentence
the child to commitment in the Texan Youth Commis-
sion with a transfer to the Texas Department of
Corrections for any term of years not to exceed 30
years". 63/ Because of the length of the sentences
authorized, the Texas law provides juveniles with
a jury trial at adjudication and sentencing. p4/
Mandatory minimum terms of confinement based on
offence
While some states experiment with determinate
sentences, other jurisdictions use either offence
criteria as sentencing guidelines 65/ or mandatory
minimum sentences for certain offences. 66/
Regardless of the details of the legislative stra-
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tegy, the formal use of offence criteria as the
determinant of dispositions precludes individual-
ized consideration of a juvenile's real needs.
Under many of the mandatory minimum sentencing
statutes, the juvenile court judge retains discre-
tion whether or not to commit a juvenile to the
state's department of corrections. 67/ If the
judge does decide to incarcerate a youth, however,
she or he may also prescribe the minimum sentence
to be served for the offence. 68/ In several
jurisdictions, the mandatory sentence is non-
discretionary, and the judge must commit the
juvenile for the statutory period. 69/ These non-
discretionary mandatory minimum sentences are
typically imposed on juveniles charged with serious
or violent present offences 70/ or those who have
prior delinquency convictions. 71/ The mandatory
minimum sentences may range from 12 to 18 months;
72/ they may be until age 21; 73/ or they may be
the same as the adult maximum sentence for the same
offence. 74/
While its dispositions are generally indeter-
minate, Colorado has several statutes governing the
dispostions of violent and repeat juvenile offen-
ders, a5/ mandatory sentence offenders 76/ and
aggravated juvenile offenders. 77/ For juveniles
sentenced as violent, repeat or mandatory offen-
ders, out-of-home placement for a minimum of one
year is mandatory. 78/ If the offender is com-
mitted to an institution, the judge also speci-
fies the minimum term that must be served. When a
youth is sentenced as an aggravated juvenile
offender, the court may impose a determinate sen-
tence of five years. 79/
Connecticut uses offence-based sentencing laws
for serious juvenile offenders. Serious juvenile
offences include 39 serious crimes, such as homi-
cide, assault, sexual assault, kidnapping and the
like. 80/ If a juvenile is convicted of a serious
juvenile offence, "the court may set a period of
time up to six months during which (the Department
of Corrections) shall place such child out of his
town of residence at the commencement of such
child's commitment". 81/
Georgia's serious delinquent statute, the
Designated Felony Act, first identifies "designated
felonies". 82/ If a juvenile is sentenced as a
designated felon, then the Department of Correc-
tions retains custody over the youth for an initial
period of five years and the judge may order the
child to be confined in training school for "not
less than 12 nor more than 18 months". 83/ More-
over, if a juvenile commits a designated felony
that inflicts serious physical injury on a person
aged 62 years or older, or commits a burglary fol-
lowing two prior burglary adjudications, the court
must sentence the youth as a designated felon for
the mandatory 12-18 month term. 84/
New York's designated felony legislation pro-
vides mandatory sentences for youths convicted of
certain offences. 85/ If a youth is convicted of
a class A designated felony act and a restrictive
placement is ordered, the juvenile is committed to
the Department for Youth for an initial period of
five years, the first 12-18 months of which must
be spent in a secure facility. 86/ If the desig-
nated felony involved serious physical injury or a
victim who is 62 years or older, secure confine-
ment is mandatory. 01/ If the youth is convicted
of any other designated felony act, the initial
placement is for three years, with the first 6-12
months spent in secure confinement. 88/ Finally,
if a youth convicted of a designated felony act
has a prior conviction for a designated felony,
then the court must sentence under the five-year
class A provisions rather than the three-year
provisions. 89/
Ohio has adopted mandatory minimum sentences
based on the seriousness of the offence. The pur-
pose of the Ohio law was to decarcerate minor
offenders, reduce overcrowding and reserve the
institutions for the more serious offenders. 90/
While the judge retains discretion whether or not
to commit a youth convicted of a felony, if con-
finement is ordered, then the mandatory minimum
terms are six months, one year, or until age 21,
depending on the seriousness of offence. 91/
Moreover, if a youth is convicted of murder or a
first- or second-degree felony, the commitment
must be served in a secure facility. 92/
A number of other states, including
Delaware, 93/ Illinois, 94/ Kentucky, 95/ North
Carolina, 9j/ Tennessee 91/ and Virginia, 9J/ have
laws providing mandatory minimum sentences for
serious or repetitive juvenile offenders.
Administratively adopted determinate/presumptive
or mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines
A third form of just deserts sentencing occurs
when state departments of corrections adopt
length-of-confinement guidelines for juveniles.
These administrative guidelines use offence cri-
teria to structure institutional release decisions.
While adult corrections and parole agencies have
used release guidelines for several decades, their
use in the juvenile process is more recent.
In 1980, the Minnesota
tions adopted administrative
guidelines. Under them, a
Department of Correc-
determinate sentencing
juvenile's length of
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stay is based on the most serious offence commit-
ted and "risk of failure" factors that are "pre-
dictive to some degree of future delinquent behav-
iour". 99/ The recidivism risk factors include
prior felony adjudications and probation and parole
failures. The plan "provide(s) a more definite and
distinct relationship between the offence and the
amount of time required to bring about positive
behaviour change". 100/ This state's sentencing
guidelines for adult offenders, which are explic-
itly punitive and expressly designed to achieve
just deserts, rely on the same factors.
Arizona's Department of Corrections has
adopted length-of-confinement guidelines to govern
juvenile release decisions. 101/ The object of the
administrative guidelines is to assure that a
juvenile "shall be retained in institutional con-
finement for a period which is proportionate to
adult sentences for the same crimes". 102/ To
achieve the goals of deterrence, public protection
and proportionality, the guidelines create five
categories of offence and specify corresponding
mandatory minimum terms of confinement of 18, 12,
9, 6 and 3 months. There is no maximum limit on
institutional confinement other than a youth's
eighteenth birthday. 103/
In addition to its designated felony statute,
Georgia also uses an administrative determinate
sentencing framework that was adopted by the Divi-
sion of Youth Services in 1981. 104/ Under the
Division's uniform juvenile classification system,
committed delinquents are placed in one of five
levels based on "public risk", the primary deter-
minate of which is the seriousness of the present
offence. 105/ The length of time that a juvenile
will spend in institutional confinement is based
on the offence classification level and other
aggravating factors, such as being a habitual or
multiple offender. 106/ Georgia's decision to
adopt determinate sentencing guidelines was influ-
enced, in part, by the just deserts guidelines of
the State of Washington, the recommendations of the
Juvenile Justice Standards Project 107/ and a
desire to forestall any determinate sentencing
legislation. 108/
In California, a juvenile court judge may
commit a juvenile to the Youth Authority, a divi-
sion of the Department of Corrections. 109/ The
Youth Authority, which is responsible for running
the state's training schools, receives juvenile
offenders committed by juvenile courts and young
adult offenders (ages 18-21) sentenced by criminal
courts. The majority of Youth Authority commit-
ments come from juvenile courts, and many of these
offenders did not commit violent crimes. 110/ Once
a juvenile is sentenced to the Youth Authority,
however, the release decision is made by a youth-
ful offender parole board, whose members are
appointed by the state governor. Ill/ At an
initial hearing, the board establishes a parole
consideration date. While that date is neither "a
fixed term or sentence, nor ... a fixed parole
release date", it represents the time by which a
youth "may reasonably and realistically be expected
to achieve readiness for parole". 112/ In estab-
lishing a parole consideration date, the board uses
seven categories to reflect its assessment of the
"seriousness of the specific offences and the
degree of danger those committed to the Youth
Authority pose to the public". 113/ While the
maximum length of confinement is limited by the
jurisdiction of the Youth Authority, 114/ within
that range, the primary determinant of a youth's
length of stay is the seriousness of the
offence. 115/
Changes in juvenile court sentencing practices
There is a very strong movement in the United
States, both in theory and in practice, away from
therapeutic, individualized juvenile sentencing
practice towards determinate or mandatory sentences
based on the Principle of Offence. This trend has
emerged only since the McKeiver decision. When
McKeiver was decided, in 1970, no states used
determinate sentences, mandatory minimum sentences
or administrative sentencing guidelines for serious
juvenile offenders. Today, about one third of the
states employ one or more of these sentencing
strategies. In 1976, New York and Kentucky adopted
designated felony legislation. In 1977, the State
of Washington adopted determinate sentencing
guidelines for juveniles and Colorado passed the
first of a series of serious juvenile offender
laws. The State of Washington experiment, with its
extensive evaluation research, provided a model for
other jurisdictions. Serious offender sentencing
legislation was adopted in 1979 in Connecticut,
Illinois and North Carolina. Since 1980, 11 more
states - Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware,
Georgia, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, Tennessee,
Texas and Virginia - have adopted either mandatory
minimum serious juvenile offender laws, determinate
sentence laws or administrative guidelines.
These laws and administrative guidelines have
eliminated virtually all of the significant dis-
tinctions between sentencing practices in juvenile
and adult criminal courts. The use of determinate
sentences based on the present offence and prior
record challenges the traditional therapeutic
rationale for juvenile dispositions. Mandatory
minimum sentences based on the seriousness of the
offence avoid any reference to an offender's real
needs or best interests. The revisions in juvenile
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court purpose clauses, in placing greater emphasis
on punishment, accountability or public safety,
eliminate even rhetorical support for the rehabil-
itative goals of juvenile justice.
Implications of changing sentencing practices for
juveniles and justice
The shift in juvenile sentencing strategies
from the offender to the offence and from treat-
ment to punishment has profound implications for
the juvenile court as an institution. The explicit
emphasis on punishment contradicts prevailing
assumptions about the lack of culpability and
criminal responsibility on the part of young
offenders. Because punishment is playing an
increasing, if not a dominant, role in juvenile
court sentencing, issues of procedural justice are
being raised that the Supreme Court avoided in the
matter of McKeiver.
Offence-based sentencing and youthful criminal
responsibil it
The shift from indeterminate sentences
requires a reassessment of the criminal responsi-
bility of young people. The impositions described
above, as well as the execution of juveniles waived
to and convicted in criminal courts, are a stark
indicator of changes in attitudes about the crimi-
nal responsibility of adolescents. 116/
The premise of the original juvenile court was
the immaturity and irresponsibility of children.
The view of juveniles as lacking criminal capacity
followed from the mens rea defence of early common
law. 117/ Since the premise of criminal liability
is rational actors who make blameworthy choices and
are responsible for the consequence of their acts,
the common law recognized and exempted from
punishment categories of persons who lacked the
requisite moral and criminal responsibility. 118/
Children less than 7 years of age were conclusively
presumed to lack criminal capacity, while those
14 years of age and older were treated as fully
responsible. Between the ages of 7 and 14 years,
there was a rebuttable presumption of criminal
incapacity. 119/ Juvenile court legislation simply
extended upwards by a few years the general pre-
sumption of youthful criminal incapacity.
The emergence of the Principle of Offence in
sentencing statutes challenges these basic assump-
tions about the lack of criminal responsibility of
young people. 120/ Such legislation constitutes a
legislative judgement that the young people are
just as responsible, culpable and blameworthy as
their somewhat older counterparts and therefore
just as deserving of punishment. 121/
The extent to which young offenders, like
their older counterparts, deserve punishment hinges
on the meaning of culpability. The underlying
rationale of deserved punishments - just deserts -
derives from Von Hirsch's writings in moral phi-
losophy. 122/ Central to the contemporary deserts
theory, which addresses itself explicitly only to
adult offenders, is the notion of punishment as
censure, condemnation and blame. Proportioning
penalties to the seriousness of the crime reflects
the connection between conduct and its blame-
worthiness.
Because the principle of commensurate desert
proportions sanctions, that is, condemnation and
blame, to the seriousness of the offence, the
analysis shifts to the meaning of "seriousness".
The seriousness of an offence is the product of two
components, harm and culpability. 123/ Evaluations
of harm focus on the degree of injury inflicted,
risk created or value taken. 124/ When the harm-
fulness of a criminal act is being assessed, the
age of the perpetrator is of relatively little
consequence.
However, assessments of seriousness also
depend on the quality of the actor's choice (the
intent or mens rea) to engage in the conduct that
produced the harm. It is with respect to the
culpability of choices, that is, the blameworthi-
ness of acting in a particular harm-producing way,
that the fact of youthfulness become especially
troublesome.
Even if it is acknowledged that juveniles are
capable of inflicting harms identical to those
inflictable by older offenders, whether the juve-
niles are as culpable is a more difficult question.
Developmental psychological research suggests that
while youths of 14 or more may be abstractly aware
of right from wrong, they are less capable than
adults of making sound judgements or moral dis-
tinctions. 125/ "Juveniles are less mature - less
able to form moral judgements, less capable of
controlling their impulses, less aware of their
acts. In a word, they are less responsible, hence
less blameworthy, than are adults; their diminished
responsibility means that they 'deserve' a lesser
punishment than does an adult who commits the same
crime." 126/ In part, lessened capacity stems from
a lesser appreciation of the consequences of their
acts than adults. 127/ Moreover, the crimes of
children are seldom their fault alone; society
shares at least some of the blame for their
offences because it has truncated their opportuni-
ties to learn to make correct choices. 128/
Indeed, to the extent that the ability to make
responsible choices is learned behaviour, the
dependent status of youth systematically deprives
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them of opportunities to learn to be respon-
sible. 129/ Finally, even when juveniles are
aware of the general criminal prohibition, they
are more susceptible to peer group influences and
group process dynamics than their older counter-
parts. 1M./
The changes in sentencing legislation analysed
above ignore many of the apparent differences in
culpability between adolescents and young adults.
By punishing juveniles for criminal choices as if
they were as criminally responsible as adults, such
legislation denies the deterministic premises of
the juvenile court that a juvenile's crime is not
his "fault". While juvenile sentences may be
shorter than the adult sentences, they are sub-
stantial nonetheless.
The quality of procedural justice in juvenile
courts: the consequences of acknowledging
punishment
Basing the sentence of a juvenile on the
seriousness of the present offence and prior record
also raises questions about the quality of pro-
cedural justice in juvenile courts. In the decades
since Gault, there has been a substantial conver-
gence between the formal procedural attributes of
criminal courts and juvenile courts. The greater
procedural formality of the juvenile courts and the
fact that they are now more adversary in nature
reflect the attenuation of their therapeutic mis-
sions and social control functions.
Despite the criminalization of juvenile jus-
tice, it remains nearly as true today as it was two
decades ago that "the child receives the worst of
both worlds: that (the child) gets neither the
protections accorded to adults nor the solicitious
care and regenerate treatment postulated for chil-
dren". 131/ Most state juvenile codes provide
neither special procedural safeguards to protect
juveniles from the consequences of their own imma-
turity nor the full panoply of adult criminal
procedural safeguards to protect them from puni-
tive state intervention. Instead, they employ
procedures that assure that juveniles continue to
receive the worst of both worlds: they treat
juvenile offenders just like adult criminal defen-
dants when formal equality redounds to their dis-
advantage and use the less effective juvenile court
procedures when those procedural deficiencies
redound to the advantage of the state.
Jury trials in juvenile court
Two procedural aspects of juvenile justice
administration are critical when sentences are
dictated by the characteristics of the offence
rather than the offender. Although the Supreme
Court in McKeiver denied juveniles the right to a
jury trial and posited virtual parity between the
quality of juvenile and adult adjudications, it is
easier to convict a youth appearing before a judge
in juvenile court than to convict him or her, on
the basis of the same evidence, before a jury of
detached citizens in a criminal proceeding. 132/
The increased punitiveness of juvenile jus-
tice raises a dilemma of constitutional dimen-
sions: "Is it fair, in the constitutional sense,
to expose minors to adult sanctions for crimes,
without granting them the same due process rights
as adults? ... The campaign to impose adult-type
sanctions on children will collide with advocates
who argue that children exposed to adult sanc-
tions must have the same due process rights as
adults." 133/ Very few of the states that sentence
juveniles on the basis of the Principle of Offence
provide jury trials, 134/ and several of those
states have explicitly rejected requests for jury
trials. 135/ For juvenile justice operatives, the
jury trial has symbolic implications out of all
proportion to its practical impact. 136/ Jury
trials require candor and honesty about the puni-
tive reality of juvenile justice and engender a
corresponding need to provide safeguards against
even benevolently motivated governmental coercion.
Rights to counsel in juvenile court
A second issue of procedural justice hinges
on access to and the competence of legal counsel
in the juvenile court. While juveniles have been
constitutionally entitled to representation by
counsel since Gault, the right to counsel appears
to be honoured more in the breach than in the
observance. In many states, fewer than half the
juveniles adjudicated delinquent receive the
assistance of counsel, to which they are constitu-
tionally entitled. 137/ Surveys in several juris-
dictions give "reason to think that lawyers still
appear (in juvenile court) much less often than
might have been expected". 138/ The most compre-
hensive study to date reports that in half the
states, "nearly half or more of delinquent and
status offenders did not have lawyers, including
many youths who received out-of-home placement and
secure confinement dispositions". 139/ The one
inescapable fact of juvenile justice administration
is that in many states, the majority of youths
prosecuted as delinquents are not represented by
counsel during the process. 140/ While there are
several possible explanations for the fact that so
many youths are unrepresented, these juveniles face
potentially coercive state action without an
attorney or without appreciating the legal conse-
quences, and face the prosecutorial power of the
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state alone and unaided. As juvenile courts become
more punitive, the right to counsel acquires even
greater salience. 141/
The punitive juvenile court
Historical justifications for the procedural
deficiencies of the juvenile court are untenable
in an institution that is increasingly punitive.
Legislative and administrative changes in juvenile
sentencing practices reflect a philosophical,
ambivalence about the continued role of the juve-
nile court. 142/ As juvenile courts converge with
adult criminal courts, is there any reason to
maintain a separate juvenile court whose sole
distinguishing characteristic is its persisting
procedural deficiencies? 143/
The juvenile court is at a philosophical
crossroads, with the future direction unresolvable
by simplistic treatment-versus-punishment formula-
tions. In reality, there are no practical or
operational differences between the two disposi-
tions: "sometimes punishment is treatment". Once
having recognized the punitive reality of juvenile
court intervention, there is a concomitant obliga-
tion to provide appropriate procedural safeguards,
since "the condition of being a (child) does not
justify a kangaroo court". 144/ While providing
young offenders with full procedural parity may,
as the Supreme Court had feared, sound the death-
knell of the juvenile court, 145/ failing to do so
is to perpetuate injustice.
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